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* [rpms/chromium] epel9-next: - Update to 138.0.7204.168
@ 2026-08-07 16:07 Than Ngo
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Than Ngo @ 2026-08-07 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: git-commits
A new commit has been pushed.
Repo : rpms/chromium
Branch : epel9-next
Commit : bba35291041b168c4ae06c895e7d680611f559d5
Author : Than Ngo <than@redhat.com>
Date : 2025-07-23T13:18:58+02:00
Stats : +52/-64 in 3 file(s)
URL : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/chromium/c/bba35291041b168c4ae06c895e7d680611f559d5?branch=epel9-next
Log:
- Update to 138.0.7204.168
* CVE-2025-8010: Type Confusion in V8
* CVE-2025-8011: Type Confusion in V8
---
diff --git a/0001-sandbox-linux-Update-syscall-helpers-lists-for-ppc64.patch b/0001-sandbox-linux-Update-syscall-helpers-lists-for-ppc64.patch
index 3a74920..f725173 100644
--- a/0001-sandbox-linux-Update-syscall-helpers-lists-for-ppc64.patch
+++ b/0001-sandbox-linux-Update-syscall-helpers-lists-for-ppc64.patch
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ Subject: [PATCH] sandbox/linux: Update syscall helpers/lists for ppc64
sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc | 2 +-
6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
+--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
++++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ bool IsBaselinePolicyWatched(int sysno)
SyscallSets::IsPrctl(sysno) ||
SyscallSets::IsProcessGroupOrSession(sysno) ||
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.
SyscallSets::IsSocketCall(sysno) ||
#endif
#if defined(__arm__)
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
+@@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
}
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || \
@@ -35,7 +33,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.
if (sysno == __NR_mmap)
return RestrictMmapFlags();
#endif
-@@ -276,7 +277,7 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
+@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
return RestrictPrctl();
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__mips__) || \
@@ -44,7 +42,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.
if (sysno == __NR_socketpair) {
// Only allow AF_UNIX, PF_UNIX. Crash if anything else is seen.
static_assert(AF_UNIX == PF_UNIX,
-@@ -340,7 +341,8 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
+@@ -344,7 +345,8 @@ ResultExpr EvaluateSyscallImpl(int fs_de
}
#if defined(__i386__) || \
@@ -54,11 +52,9 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.
if (SyscallSets::IsSocketCall(sysno))
return RestrictSocketcallCommand();
#endif
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
++++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_time.h"
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
!defined(PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA)
// Also include asm/ptrace-abi.h since ptrace.h in older libc (for instance
// the one in Ubuntu 16.04 LTS) is missing PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA.
-@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@
+@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@
#include <asm/ptrace-abi.h>
#endif
@@ -79,7 +75,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
#if !defined(F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC)
-@@ -102,6 +107,15 @@ inline bool IsArchitectureMips() {
+@@ -104,6 +109,15 @@ inline bool IsArchitectureMips() {
#endif
}
@@ -95,7 +91,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
// Ubuntu's version of glibc has a race condition in sem_post that can cause
// it to call futex(2) with bogus op arguments. To workaround this, we need
// to allow those futex(2) calls to fail with EINVAL, instead of crashing the
-@@ -269,9 +283,11 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
+@@ -271,9 +285,11 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
// operator.
// Glibc overrides the kernel's O_LARGEFILE value. Account for this.
uint64_t kOLargeFileFlag = O_LARGEFILE;
@@ -108,7 +104,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
const Arg<int> cmd(1);
const Arg<long> long_arg(2);
-@@ -294,8 +310,17 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
+@@ -296,8 +312,17 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
F_SETLKW,
F_GETLK,
F_DUPFD,
@@ -128,7 +124,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
.Case(F_SETFL,
If((long_arg & ~kAllowedMask) == 0, Allow()).Else(CrashSIGSYS()))
.Case(F_ADD_SEALS,
-@@ -304,7 +329,7 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
+@@ -306,7 +331,7 @@ ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands() {
// clang-format on
}
@@ -137,7 +133,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
ResultExpr RestrictSocketcallCommand() {
// Unfortunately, we are unable to restrict the first parameter to
// socketpair(2). Whilst initially sounding bad, it's noteworthy that very
-@@ -470,7 +495,7 @@ ResultExpr RestrictPtrace() {
+@@ -475,7 +500,7 @@ ResultExpr RestrictPtrace() {
#endif
return Switch(request)
.Cases({
@@ -146,10 +142,8 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
PTRACE_GETREGS, PTRACE_GETFPREGS, PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA,
PTRACE_GETREGSET,
#endif
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
+--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
++++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr Restr
// O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC | O_LARGEFILE | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME.
SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands();
@@ -159,10 +153,8 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_paramete
// Restrict socketcall(2) to only allow socketpair(2), send(2), recv(2),
// sendto(2), recvfrom(2), shutdown(2), sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2).
SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSocketcallCommand();
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
+--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
++++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedGettime(int s
switch (sysno) {
case __NR_gettimeofday:
@@ -319,15 +311,6 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_waitpid:
#endif
return true;
-@@ -452,7 +464,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedProcessStartO
- #endif
- case __NR_set_tid_address:
- case __NR_unshare:
--#if !defined(__mips__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
-+#if !defined(__mips__) && !defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
- case __NR_vfork:
- #endif
- default:
@@ -499,7 +511,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedEpoll(int sys
bool SyscallSets::IsDeniedGetOrModifySocket(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
@@ -376,7 +359,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR__llseek:
#endif
#if !defined(__aarch64__)
-@@ -604,26 +619,28 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedGeneralIo(int
+@@ -604,18 +619,19 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedGeneralIo(int
case __NR_readv:
case __NR_pread64:
#if defined(__arm__) || \
@@ -399,19 +382,23 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
case __NR__newselect:
#endif
+ case __NR_write:
+@@ -635,11 +651,12 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedGeneralIo(int
+ case __NR_vmsplice:
+ // send* syscalls need their flags filtered.
#if defined(__arm__) || \
- (defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPS_FAMILY) && defined(ARCH_CPU_32_BITS))
+ (defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPS_FAMILY) && defined(ARCH_CPU_32_BITS)) || \
+ defined(__powerpc64__)
case __NR_send:
#endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__mips__) || \
-- defined(__aarch64__)
-+ defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
+ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || \
+- defined(__mips__) || defined(__aarch64__)
++ defined(__mips__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
case __NR_sendmsg: // Could specify destination.
case __NR_sendto: // Could specify destination.
#endif
-@@ -679,7 +696,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedBasicSchedule
+@@ -697,7 +714,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedBasicSchedule
return true;
case __NR_getpriority:
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__) || \
@@ -421,7 +408,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_nice:
#endif
case __NR_setpriority:
-@@ -691,7 +709,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedBasicSchedule
+@@ -709,7 +727,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedBasicSchedule
bool SyscallSets::IsAdminOperation(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__) || \
@@ -431,7 +418,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_bdflush:
#endif
case __NR_kexec_load:
-@@ -707,7 +726,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAdminOperation(int s
+@@ -725,7 +744,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAdminOperation(int s
bool SyscallSets::IsKernelModule(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
@@ -441,7 +428,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_create_module:
case __NR_get_kernel_syms: // Should ENOSYS.
case __NR_query_module:
-@@ -740,7 +760,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsFsControl(int sysno)
+@@ -758,7 +778,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsFsControl(int sysno)
case __NR_swapoff:
case __NR_swapon:
#if defined(__i386__) || \
@@ -451,7 +438,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_umount:
#endif
case __NR_umount2:
-@@ -756,7 +777,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsNuma(int sysno) {
+@@ -774,7 +795,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsNuma(int sysno) {
case __NR_getcpu:
case __NR_mbind:
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || \
@@ -460,7 +447,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_migrate_pages:
#endif
case __NR_move_pages:
-@@ -791,14 +812,15 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsGlobalProcessEnviron
+@@ -809,14 +830,15 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsGlobalProcessEnviron
switch (sysno) {
case __NR_acct: // Privileged.
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || \
@@ -479,7 +466,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_ulimit:
#endif
case __NR_getrusage:
-@@ -832,7 +854,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsGlobalSystemStatus(i
+@@ -850,7 +872,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsGlobalSystemStatus(i
#endif
case __NR_sysinfo:
case __NR_uname:
@@ -488,7 +475,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_olduname:
case __NR_oldolduname:
#endif
-@@ -916,7 +938,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVSemaphores(in
+@@ -934,7 +956,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVSemaphores(in
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || \
defined(__aarch64__) || \
@@ -498,7 +485,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
// These give a lot of ambient authority and bypass the setuid sandbox.
bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVSharedMemory(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
-@@ -947,7 +970,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVMessageQueue(
+@@ -965,7 +988,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVMessageQueue(
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || \
@@ -508,7 +495,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
// Big system V multiplexing system call.
bool SyscallSets::IsSystemVIpc(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
-@@ -967,7 +991,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAnySystemV(int sysno
+@@ -985,7 +1009,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAnySystemV(int sysno
return IsSystemVMessageQueue(sysno) || IsSystemVSemaphores(sysno) ||
IsSystemVSharedMemory(sysno);
#elif defined(__i386__) || \
@@ -518,7 +505,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
return IsSystemVIpc(sysno);
#endif
}
-@@ -1024,7 +1049,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsFaNotify(int sysno)
+@@ -1042,7 +1067,8 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsFaNotify(int sysno)
bool SyscallSets::IsTimer(int sysno) {
switch (sysno) {
case __NR_getitimer:
@@ -528,7 +515,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_alarm:
#endif
case __NR_setitimer:
-@@ -1103,18 +1129,22 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsMisc(int sysno) {
+@@ -1121,18 +1147,22 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsMisc(int sysno) {
case __NR_syncfs:
case __NR_vhangup:
// The system calls below are not implemented.
@@ -555,7 +542,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_gtty:
case __NR_idle:
case __NR_lock:
-@@ -1122,20 +1152,22 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsMisc(int sysno) {
+@@ -1140,20 +1170,22 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsMisc(int sysno) {
case __NR_prof:
case __NR_profil:
#endif
@@ -582,10 +569,8 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
case __NR_vserver:
#endif
return true;
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
+--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
++++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
@@ -46,13 +46,14 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
static bool IsDeniedGetOrModifySocket(int sysno);
@@ -603,7 +588,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
static bool IsNetworkSocketInformation(int sysno);
#endif
-@@ -84,7 +85,8 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
+@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || \
defined(__aarch64__) || \
@@ -613,7 +598,7 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
// These give a lot of ambient authority and bypass the setuid sandbox.
static bool IsSystemVSharedMemory(int sysno);
#endif
-@@ -95,7 +97,8 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
+@@ -96,7 +98,8 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || \
@@ -623,10 +608,8 @@ Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
// Big system V multiplexing system call.
static bool IsSystemVIpc(int sysno);
#endif
-Index: chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc
-===================================================================
---- chromium-136.0.7103.48.orig/sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc
-+++ chromium-136.0.7103.48/sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc
+--- a/sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc
++++ b/sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.cc
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ long sys_clone(unsigned long flags,
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_64)
return syscall(__NR_clone, flags, child_stack, ptid, ctid, tls);
diff --git a/chromium.spec b/chromium.spec
index f0189e0..53b02ea 100644
--- a/chromium.spec
+++ b/chromium.spec
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@
%endif
Name: chromium
-Version: 138.0.7204.157
+Version: 138.0.7204.168
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: A WebKit (Blink) powered web browser that Google doesn't want you to use
Url: http://www.chromium.org/Home
@@ -1741,6 +1741,11 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
+* Wed Jul 23 2025 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 138.0.7204.168-1
+- Update to 138.0.7204.168
+ * CVE-2025-8010: Type Confusion in V8
+ * CVE-2025-8011: Type Confusion in V8
+
* Wed Jul 16 2025 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 138.0.7204.157-1
- Update to 138.0.7204.157
* CVE-2025-7656: Integer overflow in V8
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 1332c42..5162e2e 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SHA512 (node-v22.14.0-stripped.tar.gz) = affddb541009c6d378049c2d7845b981335d9e7aa387efcc472e5efb621c345cd58ca69778a394f7e4ebbb5e4b1a115a389838ef1b6458ef5e98f2071b166e15
-SHA512 (chromium-138.0.7204.157-clean.tar.xz) = 5351130d8395a661376eebc27835ff8169c3a5aaefc003fd43b4262c1307f0313ba1c4d3c67465119356951797ec09fa902cbf61681a43d4b6403d213f135d5d
+SHA512 (chromium-138.0.7204.168-clean.tar.xz) = 69f610c88e641ae4ca403a73496f46d02813cb79fa917f6a9a096449b8b40a65dd0210a616df12d15a42db8c035594416838cc0da0473db6e5e45ef33b32f4b6
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