[rpms/wget1] rawhide: Fix for CVE-2026-15146, CVE-2026-58470, CVE-2026-58471, CVE-2026-58472

[rpms/wget1] rawhide: Fix for CVE-2026-15146, CVE-2026-58470, CVE-2026-58471, CVE-2026-58472

[Michal Ruprich]

A new commit has been pushed.

Repo   : rpms/wget1
Branch : rawhide
Commit : 87395f725fa3167df7906ee4b6c410fdca0d4d43
Author : Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com>
Date   : 2026-07-15T17:13:00+02:00
Stats  : +343/-1 in 5 file(s)
URL    : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/wget1/c/87395f725fa3167df7906ee4b6c410fdca0d4d43?branch=rawhide

Log:
Fix for CVE-2026-15146, CVE-2026-58470, CVE-2026-58471, CVE-2026-58472

---
diff --git a/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-15146.patch b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-15146.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6f7c37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-15146.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 4f85853f641863d5915786a8413e1a213726a62b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Acts1631 <acts1631kjv@proton.me>
+Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 17:22:55 -0400
+Subject: ftp: validate PASV/LPSV response address against control connection
+ peer
+
+* src/ftp-basic.c (ftp_pasv): Reject if peer address doesn't match advertised
+  address,
+  (ftp_lpsv): Likewise.
+
+ftp_pasv() and ftp_lpsv() copied the IP address and port advertised in
+the server's 227 response without checking that it matched the peer
+of the control connection.  A malicious or compromised FTP server
+could therefore direct wget's data connection to an arbitrary host and
+port of its choosing (e.g. an internal service unreachable from the
+attacker directly), which is a server-side request forgery.
+
+ftp_epsv() was already safe since it only extracts a port and reuses
+the pre-filled control-connection address.
+
+Fix ftp_pasv() and ftp_lpsv() the same way: capture the control
+connection's peer address via socket_ip_address() before parsing the
+response, and reject the response (FTPINVPASV) if the parsed address
+does not match.
+
+Verified with a fake FTP server that returns a PASV response pointing
+at a different loopback address (127.0.0.2 instead of the real peer
+127.0.0.1): before the fix wget connects to the spoofed address, after
+the fix it rejects the response with "Cannot parse PASV response."
+Legitimate transfers using a correctly-addressed PASV response
+continue to work.
+
+Copyright-paperwork-exempt: Yes
+---
+ src/ftp-basic.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ftp-basic.c b/src/ftp-basic.c
+index 4870256a..0f4bb821 100644
+--- a/src/ftp-basic.c
++++ b/src/ftp-basic.c
+@@ -623,10 +623,19 @@ ftp_pasv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   int nwritten, i;
+   uerr_t err;
+   unsigned char tmp[6];
++  ip_address peer_addr;
+ 
+   assert (addr != NULL);
+   assert (port != NULL);
+ 
++  /* Remember who we are talking to on the control connection, so that
++     the address returned in the PASV response can be checked below.
++     Accepting an arbitrary server-supplied address would let a
++     malicious FTP server redirect our data connection to any host of
++     its choosing (SSRF).  */
++  if (!socket_ip_address (csock, &peer_addr, ENDPOINT_PEER))
++    return FTPINVPASV;
++
+   xzero (*addr);
+ 
+   /* Form the request.  */
+@@ -677,6 +686,16 @@ ftp_pasv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   memcpy (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), tmp, 4);
+   *port = ((tmp[4] << 8) & 0xff00) + tmp[5];
+ 
++  /* Reject the response if the advertised address does not match the
++     control connection's peer.  */
++  if (peer_addr.family != AF_INET
++      || memcmp (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), IP_INADDR_DATA (&peer_addr), 4) != 0)
++    {
++      xzero (*addr);
++      *port = 0;
++      return FTPINVPASV;
++    }
++
+   return FTPOK;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -692,10 +711,19 @@ ftp_lpsv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   uerr_t err;
+   unsigned char tmp[16];
+   unsigned char tmpprt[2];
++  ip_address peer_addr;
+ 
+   assert (addr != NULL);
+   assert (port != NULL);
+ 
++  /* Remember who we are talking to on the control connection, so that
++     the address returned in the LPSV response can be checked below.
++     Accepting an arbitrary server-supplied address would let a
++     malicious FTP server redirect our data connection to any host of
++     its choosing (SSRF).  */
++  if (!socket_ip_address (csock, &peer_addr, ENDPOINT_PEER))
++    return FTPINVPASV;
++
+   xzero (*addr);
+ 
+   /* Form the request.  */
+@@ -842,6 +870,18 @@ ftp_lpsv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+       DEBUGP (("*port is: %d\n", *port));
+     }
+ 
++  /* Reject the response if the advertised address does not match the
++     control connection's peer.  */
++  if (peer_addr.family != addr->family
++      || memcmp (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), IP_INADDR_DATA (&peer_addr),
++                 af == 4 ? 4 : 16) != 0)
++    {
++      xzero (*addr);
++      *port = 0;
++      xfree (respline);
++      return FTPINVPASV;
++    }
++
+   xfree (respline);
+   return FTPOK;
+ }
+-- 
+cgit v1.3
+

diff --git a/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58470.patch b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58470.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f983cf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58470.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 43d3ba9336bc94937e6fae2365c6ffd30c34ffcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 18:57:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] * src/http.c (parse_content_range): Fix integer overflow
+
+Reported-by: TristanInSec@gmail.com
+---
+ src/http.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c
+index 61d83df1..f447c7f7 100644
+--- a/src/http.c
++++ b/src/http.c
+@@ -914,6 +914,7 @@ parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr,
+                      wgint *last_byte_ptr, wgint *entity_length_ptr)
+ {
+   wgint num;
++  char *end;
+ 
+   /* Ancient versions of Netscape proxy server, presumably predating
+      rfc2068, sent out `Content-Range' without the "bytes"
+@@ -932,27 +933,39 @@ parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr,
+     }
+   if (!c_isdigit (*hdr))
+     return false;
+-  for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++)
+-    num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
+-  if (*hdr != '-' || !c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1)))
++
++  errno = 0;
++  num = strtol(hdr, &end, 10);
++  if (errno == ERANGE)
++    return false;
++  hdr = end;
++
++  if (*hdr++ != '-' || !c_isdigit (*hdr))
+     return false;
+   *first_byte_ptr = num;
+-  ++hdr;
+-  for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++)
+-    num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
+-  if (*hdr != '/')
++
++  errno = 0;
++  num = strtol(hdr, &end, 10);
++  if (errno == ERANGE)
++    return false;
++  hdr = end;
++
++  if (*hdr++ != '/')
+     return false;
+   *last_byte_ptr = num;
+-  if (!(c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1)) || *(hdr + 1) == '*'))
++  if (!(c_isdigit (*hdr) || *hdr == '*'))
+     return false;
+   if (*last_byte_ptr < *first_byte_ptr)
+     return false;
+-  ++hdr;
+   if (*hdr == '*')
+     num = -1;
+   else
+-    for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++)
+-      num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
++    {
++      errno = 0;
++      num = strtol(hdr, NULL, 10);
++      if (errno == ERANGE)
++        return false;
++    }
+   *entity_length_ptr = num;
+   if ((*entity_length_ptr <= *last_byte_ptr) && *entity_length_ptr != -1)
+     return false;
+-- 
+GitLab
+

diff --git a/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58471.patch b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58471.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82fc9fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58471.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From c2640fe5171c59f87c58dc9fcb195b2d18b010ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Arkadi Vainbrand <arkadva8@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 12:22:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer size handling in filename conversion
+
+* src/url.c (convert_fname): Fix buffer overflow.
+
+Copyright-paperwork-exempt: Yes
+Signed-off-by: Arkadi Vainbrand <arkadva8@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/url.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/url.c b/src/url.c
+index 7540e90f..f334456c 100644
+--- a/src/url.c
++++ b/src/url.c
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ convert_fname (char *fname)
+   const char *from_encoding = opt.encoding_remote;
+   const char *to_encoding = opt.locale;
+   iconv_t cd;
+-  size_t len, done, inlen, outlen;
++  size_t len, inlen, outlen;
+   char *s;
+   const char *orig_fname;
+ 
+@@ -1636,7 +1636,6 @@ convert_fname (char *fname)
+   inlen = strlen (fname);
+   len = outlen = inlen * 2;
+   converted_fname = s = xmalloc (outlen + 1);
+-  done = 0;
+ 
+   for (;;)
+     {
+@@ -1644,7 +1643,7 @@ convert_fname (char *fname)
+       if (iconv (cd, (ICONV_CONST char **) &fname, &inlen, &s, &outlen) == 0
+           && iconv (cd, NULL, NULL, &s, &outlen) == 0)
+         {
+-          *(converted_fname + len - outlen - done) = '\0';
++          *s = '\0';
+           iconv_close (cd);
+           DEBUGP (("Converted file name '%s' (%s) -> '%s' (%s)\n",
+                    orig_fname, from_encoding, converted_fname, to_encoding));
+@@ -1667,10 +1666,17 @@ convert_fname (char *fname)
+         }
+       else if (errno == E2BIG) /* Output buffer full */
+         {
+-          done = len;
+-          len = outlen = done + inlen * 2;
+-          converted_fname = xrealloc (converted_fname, outlen + 1);
+-          s = converted_fname + done;
++          size_t used = s - converted_fname;
++          size_t newlen = used + inlen * 2 + 1;
++
++          /* Ensure we actually grow the buffer */
++          if (newlen <= len)
++            newlen = len * 2;
++
++          converted_fname = xrealloc (converted_fname, newlen + 1);
++          len = newlen;
++          s = converted_fname + used;
++          outlen = len - used;
+         }
+       else /* Weird, we got an unspecified error */
+         {
+-- 
+GitLab
+

diff --git a/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58472.patch b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58472.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b61585c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58472.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From dd692d9cea5335b181d877ae917fe6e75587a812 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 19:13:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] * src/convert.c (html_quote_string): Fix integer+buffer
+ overflow
+
+Reported-by: TristanInSec@gmail.com
+---
+ src/convert.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/convert.c b/src/convert.c
+index feb90a35..3baec850 100644
+--- a/src/convert.c
++++ b/src/convert.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ as that of the covered work.  */
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <assert.h>
++#include <intprops.h>
+ #include "convert.h"
+ #include "url.h"
+ #include "recur.h"
+@@ -1178,21 +1179,37 @@ html_quote_string (const char *s)
+ {
+   const char *b = s;
+   char *p, *res;
+-  int i;
++  size_t i;
++  int ok;
+ 
+   /* Pass through the string, and count the new size.  */
+-  for (i = 0; *s; s++, i++)
++  for (i = 0; *s; s++)
+     {
+       if (*s == '&')
+-        i += 4;                 /* `amp;' */
++        ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4, &i);     /* `amp;' */
+       else if (*s == '<' || *s == '>')
+-        i += 3;                 /* `lt;' and `gt;' */
++        ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 3, &i);     /* `lt;' and `gt;' */
+       else if (*s == '\"')
+-        i += 5;                 /* `quot;' */
++        ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 5, &i);     /* `quot;' */
+       else if (*s == ' ')
+-        i += 4;                 /* #32; */
++        ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4, &i);     /* #32; */
++      else
++        ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 1, &i);
++
++      if (!ok)
++        {
++          DEBUGP (("Overflow detected in html_quote_string().\n"));
++          abort();
++        }
+     }
+-  res = xmalloc (i + 1);
++
++  if (!INT_ADD_OK (i, 1, &i))
++    {
++      DEBUGP (("Overflow detected in html_quote_string().\n"));
++      abort();
++    }
++
++  res = xmalloc (i);
+   s = b;
+   for (p = res; *s; s++)
+     {
+-- 
+GitLab
+

diff --git a/wget1.spec b/wget1.spec
index c48df5a..812a6a1 100644
--- a/wget1.spec
+++ b/wget1.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Summary: A utility for retrieving files using the HTTP or FTP protocols
 Name: wget1
 Version: 1.25.0
-Release: 3%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 # Generally wget is distributed under GPLv3 or later but there are files in lib/ directory
 # which are under LGPLv2.1 or later and are actually built into the resulting rpm.
 # This version of wget is built with gnutls so I believe that the 'with openssl'
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ Url: http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
 Source: https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/wget/wget-%{version}.tar.gz
 
 Patch1: wget-1.17-path.patch
+Patch2: wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-15146.patch
+Patch3: wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58470.patch
+Patch4: wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58471.patch
+Patch5: wget-1.25-fix-cve-2026-58472.patch
 
 Provides: bundled(gnulib) 
 # needed for test suite
@@ -112,6 +116,9 @@ echo ".so man1/%{name}.1" > %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/wget.1
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/wgetrc
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jul 15 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 1.25.0-4
+- Fix for CVE-2026-15146, CVE-2026-58470, CVE-2026-58471, CVE-2026-58472
+
 * Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.25.0-3
 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild