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Subject: [rpms/python3.9] f45: Fix CVE-2026-11940: symlink escape via tarfile hardlink fallback
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 11:00:57 GMT [thread overview]
Message-ID: <179301245788.1.2997495170999570690.rpms-python3.9-bf145556d855@fedoraproject.org> (raw)
A new commit has been pushed.
Repo : rpms/python3.9
Branch : f45
Commit : bf145556d855a7ca81f99b5787c4f5b3dba80c3f
Author : Miro Hrončok <miro@hroncok.cz>
Date : 2026-09-29T11:42:18+02:00
Stats : +71/-1 in 2 file(s)
URL : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/python3.9/c/bf145556d855a7ca81f99b5787c4f5b3dba80c3f?branch=f45
Log:
Fix CVE-2026-11940: symlink escape via tarfile hardlink fallback
Security fix for CVE-2026-11940: Fix symlink escape via tarfile
hardlink-extraction fallback. The patch adds a filter check on the
hardlink target name before extraction to prevent symlink escapes.
The test decorator was adapted from upstream's @symlink_test to
@support.skip_unless_symlink for Python 3.9 compatibility.
CVE: CVE-2026-11940
Upstream patches:
- https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/27dd970bf6b17ebca7c8ed486a40ab043ed7af8f
This commit was backported by Ymir, a Red Hat Enterprise Linux software maintenance AI agent.
Assisted-by: Ymir
(cherry picked from c9s commit 6c30a5bfd14b3fec9608272afc961cf9368c04ec)
---
diff --git a/00492-cve-2026-11940.patch b/00492-cve-2026-11940.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6921fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/00492-cve-2026-11940.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 14:31:38 +0100
+Subject: 00492: gh-151558: Fix symlink escape via `tarfile`
+ hardlink-extraction fallback
+
+Security fix for CVE-2026-11940
+---
+ Lib/tarfile.py | 3 +++
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
+index 209c206231..760abb6bd2 100755
+--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
+@@ -2626,6 +2626,9 @@ class TarFile(object):
+ "makelink_with_filter: if filter_function is not None, "
+ + "extraction_root must also not be None")
+ try:
++ filter_function(
++ unfiltered.replace(name=tarinfo.name, deep=False),
++ extraction_root)
+ filtered = filter_function(unfiltered, extraction_root)
+ except _FILTER_ERRORS as cause:
+ raise LinkFallbackError(tarinfo, unfiltered.name) from cause
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index 17d2239339..2295a2c853 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -3850,6 +3850,30 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase):
+ self.expect_file("boom", symlink_to='../../link_here')
+ self.expect_file("c", symlink_to='b')
+
++ @support.skip_unless_symlink
++ def test_sneaky_hardlink_fallback_deep(self):
++ # (CVE-2026-11940)
++ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
++ arc.add("a/b/s", symlink_to=os.path.join("..", "escape"))
++ arc.add("s", hardlink_to=os.path.join("a", "b", "s"))
++
++ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
++ e = self.expect_exception(
++ tarfile.LinkFallbackError,
++ "link 's' would be extracted as a copy of "
++ + "'a/b/s', which was rejected")
++ self.assertIsInstance(e.__cause__,
++ tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError)
++
++ for filter in 'tar', 'fully_trusted':
++ with self.subTest(filter), self.check_context(arc.open(), filter):
++ if not support.can_symlink():
++ self.expect_file("a/")
++ self.expect_file("a/b/")
++ else:
++ self.expect_file("a/b/s", symlink_to=os.path.join('..', 'escape'))
++ self.expect_file("s", symlink_to=os.path.join('..', 'escape'))
++
+ def test_exfiltration_via_symlink(self):
+ # (CVE-2025-4138)
+ # Test changing symlinks that result in a symlink pointing outside
diff --git a/python3.9.spec b/python3.9.spec
index ad822db..0e1b841 100644
--- a/python3.9.spec
+++ b/python3.9.spec
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
#global prerel ...
%global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel}
Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}}
-Release: 14%{?dist}
+Release: 15%{?dist}
# Python is Python-2.0.1
# pip is MIT and bundles:
# CacheControl: Apache-2.0
@@ -593,6 +593,12 @@ Patch490: 00490-cve-2026-15308.patch
# it's not supported.
Patch491: 00491-gh-149776-skip-udp-lite-tests-if-it-s-not-supported.patch
+# 00492 # edbba0d88308d6364f7cd438100d6b76b7f8d922
+# gh-151558: Fix symlink escape via `tarfile` hardlink-extraction fallback
+#
+# Security fix for CVE-2026-11940
+Patch492: 00492-cve-2026-11940.patch
+
# (New patches go here ^^^)
#
# When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@@ -2080,6 +2086,9 @@ CheckPython optimized
# ======================================================
%changelog
+* Wed Sep 23 2026 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.9.25-15
+- Security fix for CVE-2026-11940
+
* Wed Sep 23 2026 Lukáš Zachar <lzachar@redhat.com> - 3.9.25-14
- Security fix for CVE-2026-15308
Resolves: rhbz#2498693
reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 11:00 UTC|newest]
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