[rpms/python-pip] f43: Security fixes for CVE-2026-13346 and CVE-2026-8643

[Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>]

            A new commit has been pushed.

            Repo   : rpms/python-pip
            Branch : f43
            Commit : a1b6765c8d7240fbf8ee09e539d6b32d623273b9
            Author : Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
            Date   : 2026-08-28T16:24:19+02:00
            Stats  : +481/-0 in 3 file(s)
            URL    : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/python-pip/c/a1b6765c8d7240fbf8ee09e539d6b32d623273b9?branch=f43

            Log:
            Security fixes for CVE-2026-13346 and CVE-2026-8643

(cherry picked from commit 40c9b4419c45204aa711a33330c3b00688c56729)

Co-Authored-By: Miro Hrončok <miro@hroncok.cz>

---
diff --git a/CVE-2026-13346.patch b/CVE-2026-13346.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..509e9f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2026-13346.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+From 2411dd7e5f20c605322f3cb64f10d2f181e4e796 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damian Shaw <damian.peter.shaw@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:49:19 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix Link.filename double URL decode - path traversal
+ (CVE-2026-13346)
+
+Upstream PRs: https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/14110
+
+- Add PathComponent newtype to enforce single-component filenames
+- Remove double urllib.parse.unquote() call in Link.filename
+- Add join_within_directory() preventing path escape at download sites
+- Update download.py and prepare.py call sites
+- Backport test coverage from upstream commits 1, 3, 4 of PR #14110
+
+Co-Authored-By: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/pip/_internal/models/link.py        |  59 ++++++++++---
+ src/pip/_internal/network/download.py   |  18 ++--
+ src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py |   6 +-
+ tests/unit/test_link.py                 | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py b/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py
+index 38423d1..6a855e2 100644
+--- a/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py
++++ b/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from typing import (
+     List,
+     Mapping,
+     NamedTuple,
++    NewType,
+     Optional,
+     Tuple,
+     Union,
+@@ -36,6 +37,47 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
+ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+ 
+ 
++# A single path component: percent-decoded once and reduced to a basename, so it
++# contains no path separator and is not a ``.`` or ``..`` reference. The empty
++# string means "no component".
++PathComponent = NewType("PathComponent", str)
++
++
++def _to_path_component(name: str) -> PathComponent:
++    """Reduce ``name`` to a single path component, or ``""`` if it has none.
++
++    ``os.path.basename`` drops any directory part, drive letter, or separator;
++    a ``.``, ``..``, or empty result is not a component and becomes ``""``.
++    """
++    name = os.path.basename(name)
++    if name in ("", os.curdir, os.pardir):
++        return PathComponent("")
++
++    return PathComponent(name)
++
++
++def as_path_component(name: str) -> PathComponent:
++    """Like ``_to_path_component`` but reject the empty result.
++
++    Use where a file is about to be written, so a missing name is an error
++    rather than a silent fallback to the directory itself.
++    """
++    component = _to_path_component(name)
++    if not component:
++        raise ValueError(f"Unexpected file name derived from URL: {name!r}")
++
++    return component
++
++
++def join_within_directory(directory: str, component: PathComponent) -> str:
++    """Join a single path ``component`` onto ``directory``.
++
++    ``component`` is a :data:`PathComponent`, so by type it has no separator and
++    is not a ``.`` or ``..`` reference; the result can never escape ``directory``.
++    """
++    return os.path.join(directory, component)
++
++
+ # Order matters, earlier hashes have a precedence over later hashes for what
+ # we will pick to use.
+ _SUPPORTED_HASHES = ("sha512", "sha384", "sha256", "sha224", "sha1", "md5")
+@@ -413,18 +455,13 @@ class Link:
+         return redact_auth_from_url(self.url)
+ 
+     @property
+-    def filename(self) -> str:
+-        path = self.path.rstrip("/")
+-        name = posixpath.basename(path)
+-        if not name:
+-            # Make sure we don't leak auth information if the netloc
+-            # includes a username and password.
+-            netloc, user_pass = split_auth_from_netloc(self.netloc)
+-            return netloc
++    def filename(self) -> PathComponent:
++        name = _to_path_component(posixpath.basename(self.path.rstrip("/")))
++        if name:
++            return name
+ 
+-        name = urllib.parse.unquote(name)
+-        assert name, f"URL {self._url!r} produced no filename"
+-        return name
++        # No component in the path; fall back to the netloc, dropping any auth.
++        return _to_path_component(split_auth_from_netloc(self.netloc)[0])
+ 
+     @property
+     def file_path(self) -> str:
+diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py b/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py
+index 15ef58b..f1c1592 100644
+--- a/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py
++++ b/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py
+@@ -13,7 +13,12 @@ from pip._vendor.urllib3.exceptions import ReadTimeoutError
+ from pip._internal.cli.progress_bars import get_download_progress_renderer
+ from pip._internal.exceptions import IncompleteDownloadError, NetworkConnectionError
+ from pip._internal.models.index import PyPI
+-from pip._internal.models.link import Link
++from pip._internal.models.link import (
++    Link,
++    PathComponent,
++    as_path_component,
++    join_within_directory,
++)
+ from pip._internal.network.cache import is_from_cache
+ from pip._internal.network.session import PipSession
+ from pip._internal.network.utils import HEADERS, raise_for_status, response_chunks
+@@ -110,11 +115,14 @@ def parse_content_disposition(content_disposition: str, default_filename: str) -
+     return filename or default_filename
+ 
+ 
+-def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> str:
++def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> PathComponent:
+     """Get an ideal filename from the given HTTP response, falling back to
+     the link filename if not provided.
++
++    The result is validated as a single path component, so it can be joined onto
++    a download directory without escaping it.
+     """
+-    filename = link.filename  # fallback
++    filename: str = link.filename  # fallback
+     # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess
+     content_disposition = resp.headers.get("content-disposition")
+     if content_disposition:
+@@ -128,7 +136,7 @@ def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> str:
+         ext = os.path.splitext(resp.url)[1]
+         if ext:
+             filename += ext
+-    return filename
++    return as_path_component(filename)
+ 
+ 
+ def _http_get_download(
+@@ -179,7 +187,7 @@ class Downloader:
+         content_type = resp.headers.get("Content-Type", "")
+ 
+         filename = _get_http_response_filename(resp, link)
+-        filepath = os.path.join(location, filename)
++        filepath = join_within_directory(location, filename)
+ 
+         with open(filepath, "wb") as content_file:
+             bytes_received = self._process_response(
+diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py b/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py
+index 531070a..c8fef4d 100644
+--- a/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py
++++ b/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ from pip._internal.exceptions import (
+ from pip._internal.index.package_finder import PackageFinder
+ from pip._internal.metadata import BaseDistribution, get_metadata_distribution
+ from pip._internal.models.direct_url import ArchiveInfo
+-from pip._internal.models.link import Link
++from pip._internal.models.link import Link, join_within_directory
+ from pip._internal.models.wheel import Wheel
+ from pip._internal.network.download import BatchDownloader, Downloader
+ from pip._internal.network.lazy_wheel import (
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ def _check_download_dir(
+     """Check download_dir for previously downloaded file with correct hash
+     If a correct file is found return its path else None
+     """
+-    download_path = os.path.join(download_dir, link.filename)
++    download_path = join_within_directory(download_dir, link.filename)
+ 
+     if not os.path.exists(download_path):
+         return None
+@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ class RequirementPreparer:
+             # No distribution was downloaded for this requirement.
+             return
+ 
+-        download_location = os.path.join(self.download_dir, link.filename)
++        download_location = join_within_directory(self.download_dir, link.filename)
+         if not os.path.exists(download_location):
+             shutil.copy(req.local_file_path, download_location)
+             download_path = display_path(download_location)
+diff --git a/tests/unit/test_link.py b/tests/unit/test_link.py
+index a379d87..dc9cdbf 100644
+--- a/tests/unit/test_link.py
++++ b/tests/unit/test_link.py
+@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
++import os
++import posixpath
+ from typing import Optional
+ 
+ import pytest
+ 
+-from pip._internal.models.link import Link, links_equivalent
++from pip._internal.models.link import (
++    Link,
++    as_path_component,
++    join_within_directory,
++    links_equivalent,
++)
+ from pip._internal.utils.hashes import Hashes
+ 
+ 
+@@ -28,6 +35,13 @@ class TestLink:
+             ("https://example.com/path/page.html", "page.html"),
+             # Test a quoted character.
+             ("https://example.com/path/page%231.html", "page#1.html"),
++            # A doubly-encoded separator must stay encoded: the path is decoded
++            # exactly once, so the file name keeps its literal "%2F" instead of
++            # collapsing into a "/".
++            (
++                "https://example.com/a%252Fb.whl",
++                "a%2Fb.whl",
++            ),
+             (
+                 "http://yo/myproject-1.0%2Bfoobar.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl",
+                 "myproject-1.0+foobar.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl",
+@@ -48,6 +62,52 @@ class TestLink:
+         link = Link(url)
+         assert link.filename == expected
+ 
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "url",
++        [
++            "https://example.com/a%252Fb.whl",
++            "https://example.com/%252e%252e%252fb.whl",
++        ],
++    )
++    def test_filename_decoded_once_stays_single_component(self, url: str) -> None:
++        # The path is decoded exactly once, so an encoded separator stays
++        # encoded and the file name remains a single path component rather
++        # than collapsing into a "/"-separated path.
++        filename = Link(url).filename
++        assert not posixpath.isabs(filename)
++        assert posixpath.basename(filename) == filename
++
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "url",
++        [
++            "https://example.com/..",
++            "https://example.com/.",
++            "https://example.com/foo/%2e%2e",
++        ],
++    )
++    def test_filename_parent_reference_falls_back_to_netloc(self, url: str) -> None:
++        # A path that is only a "." or ".." reference has no usable file name,
++        # so filename falls back to the netloc rather than handing back a
++        # traversal component that could escape a download directory.
++        assert Link(url).filename == "example.com"
++
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "url",
++        [
++            # A path-less URL whose authority looks like a traversal: the netloc
++            # fallback must still reduce to a single path component.
++            "http://..\\..\\..\\evil.whl",
++            "http://../",
++            "http://..",
++        ],
++    )
++    def test_filename_is_always_a_path_component(self, url: str) -> None:
++        # filename must never carry a separator or parent reference, so joining
++        # it onto a directory can never escape that directory.
++        name = Link(url).filename
++        assert os.path.basename(name) == name
++        assert name not in (os.curdir, os.pardir)
++
+     def test_splitext(self) -> None:
+         assert ("wheel", ".whl") == Link("http://yo/wheel.whl").splitext()
+ 
+@@ -240,3 +300,53 @@ def test_links_equivalent(url1: str, url2: str) -> None:
+ )
+ def test_links_equivalent_false(url1: str, url2: str) -> None:
+     assert not links_equivalent(Link(url1), Link(url2))
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize(
++    "name",
++    [
++        "wheel.whl",
++        "myproject-1.0+foobar.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl",
++        # A literal "%2F" is a normal file name, not a separator.
++        "a%2Fb.whl",
++    ],
++)
++def test_as_path_component_keeps_plain_name(name: str) -> None:
++    assert as_path_component(name) == name
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize(
++    "name",
++    [
++        os.path.join(os.sep, "abs", "pkg.whl"),
++        os.path.join("..", "pkg.whl"),
++        os.path.join("nested", "pkg.whl"),
++    ],
++)
++def test_as_path_component_reduces_to_basename(name: str) -> None:
++    # A name carrying directory components is reduced to its basename, so the
++    # result always stays inside the directory it is later joined onto.
++    assert as_path_component(name) == os.path.basename(name)
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", ["", ".", "..", "/", os.path.join("sub", "..")])
++def test_as_path_component_rejects_empty_or_parent_reference(name: str) -> None:
++    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
++        as_path_component(name)
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize(
++    "name",
++    [
++        "pkg.whl",
++        # A literal "%2F" is a normal file name, not a separator.
++        "a%2Fb.whl",
++    ],
++)
++def test_join_within_directory_stays_inside(name: str) -> None:
++    # The component is joined onto the directory as its final element, so the
++    # result stays inside the directory.
++    directory = os.path.join("base", "downloads")
++    joined = join_within_directory(directory, as_path_component(name))
++    assert joined == os.path.join(directory, name)
++    assert os.path.basename(joined) == name
+-- 
+2.55.0
+

diff --git a/CVE-2026-8643.patch b/CVE-2026-8643.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17976d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2026-8643.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+From 262e34b54bccc90cd514cb253d823b6a2cbcc16f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damian Shaw <damian.peter.shaw@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 23:04:43 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Reject entry point names that escape scripts dir
+
+---
+ src/pip/_internal/operations/install/wheel.py | 26 +++++++-
+ tests/unit/test_wheel.py                      | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/operations/install/wheel.py b/src/pip/_internal/operations/install/wheel.py
+index cfc3b26..e378d69 100644
+--- a/src/pip/_internal/operations/install/wheel.py
++++ b/src/pip/_internal/operations/install/wheel.py
+@@ -402,17 +402,37 @@ class MissingCallableSuffix(InstallationError):
+         )
+ 
+ 
+-def _raise_for_invalid_entrypoint(specification: str) -> None:
++def _script_within_dir(name: str, scripts_dir: str) -> bool:
++    """Return whether script ``name`` resolves to a path inside the ``scripts_dir``.
++
++    distlib joins the entry point name onto the scripts directory, so a name
++    with path separators or ``..`` components can resolve elsewhere.
++    """
++    root = os.path.normpath(scripts_dir)
++    dest = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(scripts_dir, name))
++    return dest.startswith(root + os.sep)
++
++
++def _raise_for_invalid_entrypoint(specification: str, scripts_dir: str) -> None:
+     entry = get_export_entry(specification)
+-    if entry is not None and entry.suffix is None:
++    if entry is None:
++        return
++
++    if entry.suffix is None:
+         raise MissingCallableSuffix(str(entry))
+ 
++    if not _script_within_dir(entry.name, scripts_dir):
++        raise InstallationError(
++            f"Invalid script entry point name {entry.name!r}: the script "
++            f"would be installed outside the scripts directory ({scripts_dir})."
++        )
++
+ 
+ class PipScriptMaker(ScriptMaker):
+     def make(
+         self, specification: str, options: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
+     ) -> List[str]:
+-        _raise_for_invalid_entrypoint(specification)
++        _raise_for_invalid_entrypoint(specification, self.target_dir)
+         return super().make(specification, options)
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/tests/unit/test_wheel.py b/tests/unit/test_wheel.py
+index 7b44a59..4ad371a 100644
+--- a/tests/unit/test_wheel.py
++++ b/tests/unit/test_wheel.py
+@@ -517,6 +517,32 @@ class TestInstallUnpackedWheel:
+         assert os.path.basename(wheel_path) in exc_text
+         assert entrypoint in exc_text
+ 
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_name", ["../../outside", "..", "."])
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("entry_point_type", ["console_scripts", "gui_scripts"])
++    def test_wheel_install_rejects_entry_point_path_traversal(
++        self, data: TestData, tmpdir: Path, bad_name: str, entry_point_type: str
++    ) -> None:
++        """An entry point name with separators or ``..`` must not install a
++        script outside the scripts directory.
++        """
++        self.prep(data, tmpdir)
++        wheel_path = make_wheel(
++            "simple",
++            "0.1.0",
++            entry_points={entry_point_type: [f"{bad_name} = simple:main"]},
++        ).save_to_dir(tmpdir)
++        with pytest.raises(InstallationError) as e:
++            wheel.install_wheel(
++                "simple",
++                str(wheel_path),
++                scheme=self.scheme,
++                req_description="simple",
++            )
++
++        assert "outside the scripts directory" in str(e.value)
++        # Nothing was written outside the install destination.
++        assert not os.path.exists(os.path.join(str(tmpdir), "outside"))
++
+ 
+ class TestMessageAboutScriptsNotOnPATH:
+     tilde_warning_msg = (
+@@ -720,3 +746,41 @@ def test_get_console_script_specs_replaces_python_version(
+         "not_pip_or_easy_install-99 = whatever",
+         "not_pip_or_easy_install-99.88 = whatever",
+     ]
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize(
++    "name, within",
++    [
++        ("pip", True),
++        ("pip3.13", True),
++        ("foo-bar.baz", True),
++        ("...", True),  # a literal filename, not a path component
++        ("sub/script", True),  # in-tree subdirectory
++        ("a/../b", True),
++        ("sub\\script", True),  # backslash stays in-tree on POSIX and Windows
++        (" ../../inside", True),  # distlib keeps a leading space; resolves in-tree
++        ("../outside", False),
++        ("../../outside", False),
++        ("a/../../outside", False),
++        ("/etc/cron.d/outside", False),  # absolute path; os.path.join drops the root
++        # "." and ".." pass PyPI's [\w.-]+ name check but must be rejected here.
++        (".", False),
++        ("..", False),
++        ("", False),
++    ],
++)
++def test_script_within_dir(name: str, within: bool) -> None:
++    assert wheel._script_within_dir(name, "/srv/env/bin") is within
++
++
++def test_script_within_dir_allows_doubled_slash_root() -> None:
++    # A scripts directory can have a doubled leading slash
++    assert wheel._script_within_dir("pip", "//srv/env/bin") is True
++    assert wheel._script_within_dir("../outside", "//srv/env/bin") is False
++
++
++@pytest.mark.skipif(not WINDOWS, reason="drive letters only matter on Windows")
++def test_script_within_dir_rejects_other_drive() -> None:
++    # Validate that a script on a different drive is rejected,
++    # and doesn't throw an error
++    assert wheel._script_within_dir("D:\\outside", "C:\\env\\bin") is False
+-- 
+2.55.0
+

diff --git a/python-pip.spec b/python-pip.spec
index ca0366f..ece80ed 100644
--- a/python-pip.spec
+++ b/python-pip.spec
@@ -112,6 +112,14 @@ Patch:          truststore-pem-path.patch
 # Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/f05b1329126d5be6de501f9d1e3e36738bc08857
 Patch:          urllib3-CVE-2025-50181.patch
 
+# CVE-2026-8643: entry point path traversal in console_scripts/gui_scripts
+# Upstream fix: https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/14000
+Patch:          CVE-2026-8643.patch
+
+# CVE-2026-13346: Link.filename double URL decode allows path traversal
+# Upstream fix: https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/14110
+Patch:          CVE-2026-13346.patch
+
 # Remove -s from Python shebang - ensure that packages installed with pip
 # to user locations are seen by pip itself
 %undefine _py3_shebang_s