[rpms/openssl] rebase_40beta: Instrument with USDT probes related to SHA-1 deprecation

[Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>]

A new commit has been pushed.

Repo   : rpms/openssl
Branch : rebase_40beta
Commit : 8f08128432446ac4c4df4f6f29de1bccb391d818
Author : Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Date   : 2022-04-26T19:08:09+02:00
Stats  : +246/-1 in 2 file(s)
URL    : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssl/c/8f08128432446ac4c4df4f6f29de1bccb391d818?branch=rebase_40beta

Log:
Instrument with USDT probes related to SHA-1 deprecation

---
diff --git a/0053-Add-SHA1-probes.patch b/0053-Add-SHA1-probes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b146d4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0053-Add-SHA1-probes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+From a1905af412163cf971107f51a33dff8b416ab690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 15:21:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Instrument SHA-1 signatures with USDT probes
+
+In order to discover remaining uses of SHA-1 in signatures without
+forcefully breaking the code paths, add USDT probes that can be queried
+with systemtap at runtime.
+
+This should allow identifying components that still use SHA-1 signatures
+in production so that they can be transitioned to more modern hash
+algorithms.
+---
+crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                    | 13 +++++++++----
+crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                   | 13 +++++++++----
+crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c                   |  6 +++++-
+providers/common/securitycheck.c         | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
+providers/common/securitycheck_default.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ssl/t1_lib.c                             |  8 +++++++-
+6 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+index 8da2183ce0..c17cdfa5d5 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
+ #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */
+ #include "evp_local.h"
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
+     int allowed;
+ } OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
+@@ -336,10 +338,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
+         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);
+-        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)
+-                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {
+-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+-            goto err;
++        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {
++            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++                goto err;
++            } else {
++                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_do_sigver_init_1, mdnid);
++            }
+         }
+     }
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+index 3c5a1e6f5d..589a352974 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
+ #include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "evp_local.h"
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+
+ static int evp_pkey_ctx_store_cached_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+@@ -954,10 +956,13 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
+         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
+-        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
+-                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
+-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+-            return -1;
++        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {
++            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++                return -1;
++            } else {
++                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_evp_pkey_ctx_set_md_1, mdnid);
++            }
+         }
+     }
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index 60aa26f552..d054acd5a7 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
+ #include "crypto/x509.h"
+ #include "x509_local.h"
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ /* CRL score values */
+
+ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
+@@ -3462,10 +3464,12 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+
+     if (nid == NID_sha1
+             && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
+-            && ctx->param->auth_level < 2)
++            && ctx->param->auth_level < 2) {
++        DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_check_sig_level_1, nid);
+         /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
+         return 1;
++    }
+
+     return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+ }
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+index e534ad0a5f..bf496450cf 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ #include "internal/sslconf.h"
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ /*
+  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
+  * signing), and for legacy purposes 80 bits (for decryption or verifying).
+@@ -238,11 +240,14 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
+
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+-    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
+-        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
+-         * it. */
+-        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)
++    if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed) {
++        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
++            /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
++             * it. */
+             mdnid = -1;
++        else
++            DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1_1, mdnid);
++    }
+ #endif
+
+     return mdnid;
+@@ -258,9 +263,12 @@ int ossl_digest_is_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     {
+         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
+-        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
+-                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
+-            return 0;
++        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {
++            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
++                return 0;
++            else
++                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_is_allowed_1, mdnid);
++        }
+     }
+ #endif
+
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+index ce54a94fbc..ecb3a9d4b6 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sslconf.h"
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
+ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+@@ -40,9 +42,16 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+
+     ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);
+     mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);
++    if (mdnid == NID_sha1)
++        /* This will only happen if SHA1 is allowed, otherwise mdnid is -1. */
++        DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid_1, mdnid);
+     if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
+-    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)
+-        mdnid = -1;
++    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {
++        if (ldsigs_allowed)
++            DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid_2, mdnid);
++        else
++            mdnid = -1;
++    }
+     return mdnid;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index e47ddf56f1..a4b9ff749e 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include "ssl_local.h"
+ #include <openssl/ct.h>
+
++#include <sys/sdt.h>
++
+ static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
+
+@@ -1568,6 +1570,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+             && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
+         /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
++        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_tls12_check_peer_sigalg_1, lu->hash);
+     } else {
+         /*
+          * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+@@ -2120,6 +2123,7 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+             && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
+         /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
++        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_tls12_sigalg_allowed_1, lu->hash);
+         return 1;
+     }
+
+@@ -3018,10 +3022,12 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+             && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
+             && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2)
+                 || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 2)
+-            ))
++            )) {
+         /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
++        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_ssl_security_cert_sig_1, nid);
+         return 1;
++    }
+
+     if (s)
+         return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
+--
+2.35.1

diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index af8a1f2..289670a 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 3.0.2
-Release: 3%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ Patch52: 0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
 # Support SHA1 in TLS in LEGACY crypto-policy (which is SECLEVEL=1)
 Patch52: 0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-1-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
 %endif
+%if 0%{?rhel}
+# no USDT probe instrumentation required
+%else
+# Instrument with USDT probes related to SHA-1 deprecation
+Patch53: 0053-Add-SHA1-probes.patch
+%endif
 
 License: ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -87,6 +93,7 @@ BuildRequires: perl(Module::Load::Conditional), perl(File::Temp)
 BuildRequires: perl(Time::HiRes), perl(IPC::Cmd), perl(Pod::Html), perl(Digest::SHA)
 BuildRequires: perl(FindBin), perl(lib), perl(File::Compare), perl(File::Copy), perl(bigint)
 BuildRequires: git-core
+BuildRequires: systemtap-sdt-devel
 Requires: coreutils
 Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 
@@ -403,6 +410,9 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE9} \
 %ldconfig_scriptlets libs
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Apr 26 2022 Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.2-4
+- Instrument with USDT probes related to SHA-1 deprecation
+
 * Wed Apr 20 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.2-3
 - Disable SHA-1 by default in ELN using the patches from CentOS
 - Fix a FIXME in the openssl.cnf(5) manpage