[rpms/openssl] rebase_40beta: SHA1 is allowed in @SECLEVEL=2 only if allowed by TLS SigAlgs configuration

[Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>]

            A new commit has been pushed.

            Repo   : rpms/openssl
            Branch : rebase_40beta
            Commit : ef93cf994dbde20556c77614e8ec7f3b586d48d9
            Author : Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
            Date   : 2020-06-05T17:39:16+02:00
            Stats  : +197/-20 in 4 file(s)
            URL    : https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssl/c/ef93cf994dbde20556c77614e8ec7f3b586d48d9?branch=rebase_40beta

            Log:
            SHA1 is allowed in @SECLEVEL=2 only if allowed by TLS SigAlgs configuration

Also some small TLS protocol fixes/changes:

Disallow dropping Extended Master Secret extension on renegotiation
Return alert from s_server if ALPN protocol does not match

---
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch b/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..465f7b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+commit 9e885a707d604e9528b5491b78fb9c00f41193fc
+Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 26 15:59:00 2020 +0100
+
+    s_server: Properly indicate ALPN protocol mismatch
+    
+    Return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from alpn_select_cb so that
+    an alert is sent to the client on ALPN protocol mismatch.
+    
+    Fixes: #2708
+    
+    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11415)
+
+diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
+index bcc83e562c..591c6c19c5 100644
+--- a/apps/s_server.c
++++ b/apps/s_server.c
+@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+     if (SSL_select_next_proto
+         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
+          inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
+-        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+     }
+ 
+     if (!s_quiet) {

diff --git a/openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch b/openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76adef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h.reneg-no-extms openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h.reneg-no-extms	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h	2020-06-05 15:20:22.090682776 +0200
+@@ -292,6 +292,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ 
+ # define TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS                    0x0800
+ 
++/* Set if extended master secret extension required on renegotiation */
++# define TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS               0x1000
++
+ # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST                   0
+ # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO                    1
+ # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO                    2
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.reneg-no-extms openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.reneg-no-extms	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2020-06-05 15:22:19.677653437 +0200
+@@ -1168,14 +1168,26 @@ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int
+ 
+ static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+ {
+-    if (!s->server)
++    if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
+         s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
++        s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS;
++    }
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
+ {
++    /*
++     * Check extended master secret extension is not dropped on
++     * renegotiation.
++     */
++    if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
++        && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS)) {
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
++                 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
++        return 0;
++    }
+     if (!s->server && s->hit) {
+         /*
+          * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with

diff --git a/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch b/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
index fe6c6bb..c6751a5 100644
--- a/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
---- openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel	2018-09-11 14:48:22.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2018-10-01 09:52:23.535298908 +0200
-@@ -3220,6 +3220,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2020-06-05 17:16:54.835536823 +0200
+@@ -3225,6 +3225,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c
  }
  
  static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
@@ -9,20 +9,23 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1/crypto/x509
  static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
  
  /*
-@@ -3264,6 +3265,8 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
+@@ -3276,6 +3277,11 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
  
      if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
          return 0;
 -
 -    return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
-+    /* Allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non-FIPS mode */
-+    if (FIPS_mode())
++    /*
++     * Allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non-FIPS mode or when the magic
++     * disable SHA1 flag is not set.
++     */
++    if ((ctx->param->flags & 0x40000000) || FIPS_mode())
 +        return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
 +    return secbits >= minbits_digest_table[level - 1];
  }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-1.1.1/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel	2018-09-11 14:48:22.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod	2018-10-01 09:52:23.535298908 +0200
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod	2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
 @@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited
  
  =item B<Level 2>
@@ -36,23 +39,115 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-
  In addition to the level 1 exclusions any cipher suite using RC4 is also
  prohibited. SSL version 3 is also not allowed. Compression is disabled.
  
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1/ssl/ssl_cert.c
---- openssl-1.1.1/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel	2018-09-11 14:48:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1/ssl/ssl_cert.c	2018-10-12 15:29:12.673799305 +0200
-@@ -983,6 +983,9 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c	2020-06-05 17:10:11.842198401 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                          int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                          void *ex);
++static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+ 
+ static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+@@ -396,7 +397,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_
+     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+ 
+     /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
++    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s) | sha1_disable(s, NULL));
+     if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data
+         (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
+         goto end;
+@@ -953,12 +954,33 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback
              return 0;
          break;
      default:
 +        /* allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non FIPS mode */
-+        if (nid == NID_sha1 && minbits == 112 && !FIPS_mode())
++        if (nid == NID_sha1 && minbits == 112 && !sha1_disable(s, ctx))
 +            break;
          if (bits < minbits)
              return 0;
      }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel openssl-1.1.1/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
---- openssl-1.1.1/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel	2018-09-11 14:48:24.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t	2018-10-01 09:52:23.535298908 +0200
-@@ -342,8 +342,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    unsigned long ret = 0x40000000; /* a magical internal value used by X509_VERIFY_PARAM */
++    const CERT *c;
++
++    if (FIPS_mode())
++        return ret;
++
++    if (ctx != NULL) {
++       c = ctx->cert;
++    } else {
++       c = s->cert;
++    }
++    if (tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(c))
++        return 0;
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+ {
+     return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel	2020-06-04 15:48:01.602178783 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h	2020-06-05 17:02:22.666313410 +0200
+@@ -2576,6 +2576,7 @@ __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PAC
+ __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
+ __owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ __owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd);
++int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c);
+ __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs);
+ #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ __owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve);
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel	2020-06-04 15:48:01.654179221 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2020-06-05 17:02:40.268459157 +0200
+@@ -2145,6 +2145,36 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static int tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(const uint16_t *sigalgs, size_t sigalgslen)
++{
++    size_t i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
++        const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
++
++        if (lu == NULL)
++            continue;
++        if (lu->hash == NID_sha1)
++            return 1;
++    }
++    return 0;
++}
++
++
++int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c)
++{
++    if (c->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
++        if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->client_sigalgs, c->client_sigalgslen))
++            return 1;
++    }
++    if (c->conf_sigalgs != NULL) {
++        if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->conf_sigalgs, c->conf_sigalgslen))
++            return 1;
++        return 0;
++    }
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+ {
+     int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t	2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
+@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver
  ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
      "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
  

diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 3984ecf..d4111ad 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.1.1g
-Release: 8%{?dist}
+Release: 9%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ Patch62: openssl-1.1.1-fips-curves.patch
 Patch65: openssl-1.1.1-fips-drbg-selftest.patch
 Patch66: openssl-1.1.1-fips-dh.patch
 Patch67: openssl-1.1.1-kdf-selftest.patch
+Patch68: openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch
+Patch69: openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch52: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-update.patch
 Patch53: openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch
@@ -183,6 +185,8 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch65 -p1 -b .drbg-selftest
 %patch66 -p1 -b .fips-dh
 %patch67 -p1 -b .kdf-selftest
+%patch68 -p1 -b .reneg-no-extms
+%patch69 -p1 -b .alpn-cb
 
 
 %build
@@ -469,6 +473,13 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %ldconfig_scriptlets libs
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Jun  5 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-9
+- Disallow dropping Extended Master Secret extension
+  on renegotiation
+- Return alert from s_server if ALPN protocol does not match
+- SHA1 is allowed in @SECLEVEL=2 only if allowed by
+  TLS SigAlgs configuration
+
 * Wed Jun  3 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-8
 - Add FIPS selftest for PBKDF2 and KBKDF